Introduction
In latẽ 1990 the new National government introduced the Employment Contracts BiB, the third major , effort to reshape New Zealand labour relations in 6 years. Predictably, the Bill has been enthusiastically endorsed by the Business Roundtable and the Employers' Federation, both of which had demanded far reaching labour market refotan going into the 1990 elẽction. Whether New Zealand employers, and particularly the great majority of smaller and medium sized employers, share the zeal of their oentral organization in this fespect is the subject of this paper.
As with the 1984 amendmẽnts to the Industrial Relations Act and the Labour Relations Act 1987, the Employment Contracts Bill was heralded as "the most radical piece of industrial relations legislation since 1894 ". Without necessarily appreciating why successive governments of essentially conservative people so covet the label "'most radical", it is probably fair to say that the Employment Contracts Bill stakes a reasonable claim to the title.
Nonetheless, the 3 pieces of legislation share a common themẽ and a co: mmon direction. The pre-1984 labour relations system was characterized in the main by protẽcted union jurisdictions, centrally negotiated national occupational awards with blanket coveragẽ, .and allegedly fixed wage .relativities reinforced by compulsory arbitration on demand. This syslem was portrayed as insufficiently flexible for the needs of employers and the economy. What was said to be needed was a labour relations system that generated teuus and c~nditio~s of e~ployment tailored to the circumstances of individual fn1ns, regions, or particular mdustnes.
The Business Roundtable's prescription
The Employment Contracts Bill extends the theme of its predecessors, n.~el~ that employers have been unduly restricted in their efforts to improve pr~ucUvJ_ty In an increasingly competitive world by the national award system. an~ the nan_onal un1ons that had "captured" it. More boldly than its predecessors, the Btll auns to dismantle ~e old system and meet the peroeived needs of employers for employm~nt arrangements .taiJor~d to local conditions. Where the Bill departs markedly from Its predecessors IS 1n 1ts movement beyond mere decentralization to deregulation, with the emphasis on individual rather than collective choice.
The prescription is that which has been consistently put forward over a number of years by the narrowly based Business Roundtable representing New Zealand's largest employers (Business Roundtable, 1986 , 1989 .
Until recently, the Employers' Federation, as the central employer lobby acting for the broader cross-section of New Zealand employers, had advocated a somewhat more . moderate and ideologically distinct approach to refonn, proposing essentially the adoption of the North American collective bargaining model (Employers' ' Federation, 1986) . Where the Business Roundtablẽ in 1986 espoused the right of individual employees "to negotiate and enforce their own bargains" outside of collective contracts (Business Roundtable, 1986, p.48) , the Emrloyers' Federation called ~or collective representation of whole "bargaining units" based on a majority vote of employees in the unit (Employers' Federation, 1986, p.l6-17) . Individual employment contracts werẽ ẽnvisioned only in the case of very small workplaces where collective contracts · were impractical, or in instances where employees collectively decided not to be represented collectively.
The changing Employers' Fed, eration position
The inclusive bargaining unit concept, with a single agreement covering all employees in the unit, both union members and those who chose not to join, and with one unit per workplace as the basic module, remained the cornerstone of the Employers' Federation policy through early 1990. This approach was offered as meeting the perceived need for workplace agreements, while holding open the possibility of agreements covering multiple workplaces based on company, area or indus· try structures \Vhere such were preferred (Clark, 1990, p.ll) .
A change in the Employers' Federation philosophy began to emerge in mid-1990 in reaction to the Labour Relations Amendme.nt Bill. Agreement coverage was now to be left strictly to the parties, and "multiple agreements for one site" were now envisioned (Employers' Federation, 1990a, p.7) . Following the election of the National govem~ent, ~d while ~e E~ployment Contracts BiU was being drafted, the Employers' Federa~on _sh~p.ed qutckly tnto line behind the Business Roundtable prescription, advocating Individual freedom and a multiplicity of bargains on site to "ensure no-one worker or employer, is covered by an award or agreement without their consent': (Employers ' Federation, 1990b, p.8) .
While ~he Employer~' F.ederation's ~road theme of employer flexibility through labour relations d~entrahzau?n has r~~atned consistent, the shift in its emphasis from ~egulat~ decentrallzed collective bargaining to an inviolate individual freedom to contract IS a radical one. Presuma?Iy it reflects a power shift within the Employers' Federation in favour of those of the Business Roundtable persuasion.
Labour relations reform 3 It necessarily calJs into question the extent to which the Employers' Federation, in decrying the supposedly restraining impact of unions and the award system, and in demanding first decentralization, and now deregulation of the labour relations system, accurately reflects the views and ẽxperiences of its members, and most especially those of the smaller and medium sized fu·nas that are the great majority of New Zealand employers.
The intent of the research reported in this paper was to ' t, est the fundamental proposition expounded by the Employers' Federation that employers have felt unduly restricted by unions and the national award system, leading them to demand radical refonn of the labour relations system.
Study design and sample
In an effort to ẽxamine the impact of unions and the award system from the perspective of employers, semi-structured interviews wefe conducted with fepresentatives of 92 firrns in Õtago and Southland. The sample was derived from earlier labour relations research in which a postal survey was mailed in 1988 to the 476 member fn1ns of the Otago-Southland Employers' Association then employing betwẽen 10 and 100 staff. Of these, 222 firms responded, 117 of them indicating that they were prepared to participate in a follow-up interview. At the time of scheduling interviews, 92 remained in business and willing to participate . . The interviews were conducted between January, 1989 and March, 1990. Characteristics of the sample About one-half of those interviewed for the project had a proprietary interest in the finn they were representing. The remainder were mostly chief executives, other than a small number of personnel managers. Almost 60 percent of the fi1n1s in the sample had just a single place of business; only 10 percent had more than 3. About one-half of the fmns were located in the main centre of Dunedin, with the remainder scattered around the Otago-Southland area.
In teJ 1ns of the major divisions of the New Zealand Standard Enterprise Industry Classification, 14 of the fiuns were in Agriculture, Forestry or Fishing; 2 were in Mining or Quarrying; 20 were in Manufacturing; 14 were in Building or Construction; 22 werẽ in Wholesale or Retail Trade; 9 were in Transport and Storage; 1 was in Business Services; and 10 were in Community, Social or Personal Services.
At the time of the interviews, 38 of the firn. as had 25 or less employees, another 38 had between 26 and 75 : employees, and the remainder had more than 75 employees.
Labour relations profile
The fu ans in the sample werẽ, for the most part, in the mainstream of the labour relations system. In all but a handful of fu 1ns, 70 percent or more of the employees were covered by a union-negotiated award or agi~eemẽnt, with one-third of the fmns having 90 percent or better of their employees so covered.
The frrms dealt, on average, with fractionally less than 3 unions and fractionally more than 3 awards or agreements, with the numbers of both unions and union-negotiated documẽnts closely corrẽlated with the size of the · workforce. A total of 30 unions represented ẽmployees in the sample finns, with all but 4 of them being the principal or majority union in at least 1 firm in the sample. Õf the 30 unions, the Drivers, Engineers, and Shop Assistants unions wẽre most often the principal union in the fnna, while the Clerical Workers Union represented employees in the largest number of fnans.
McAndrew and Hurstbouse
In over one-half of the fii rns, the principal union represented 80 percent ~r more of the firm's unionized employees. In some such instances, the representattve of ~e principal union handled matters arising amongst other uni~nized ~mployees as ~ell, with the principal union effectively functioning as the sole umon on Site, at le~t "':'1th reg~d to day-to-day labour relations issues. In almost all of the fu·nts, the pr1nc1pal unton represented at least one-half of the unioniz~ ~mploy~s.
. . Finally, in their dealings with the pnnc1pal union represent1ng thel! empl~yees, ~0 percent of the interviewees reported that they dealt or would deal exclusively wtth a paid union official. This large majority included a considerable number who could not recall ever having dealt with the union, and who knew of no union delegate amongst the workforce. About 20 percent of lhe funts dealt with the union primarily through a shop floor delegate.
. . Evaluating the award system
As noted, the sample firms were in the mainstream of the labour relatio~s· system, and this was very much so in their award coverage. In over three-quarters of the firans, employees · were covered exclusively by national (or near-national) awards, while only 6 firms had no employees covered by national awards. In 3 of the fi1nas, employees were covered exclusively by Otago-Southland regional awards. Of the less than 10 percent having any experience with enterprise agreements, 2 filrr1s had unionized employees covered exclusively by such house agreements. In 17 fun1s, employees were represented under a combination of 2 or all 3 types of documents, almost always including at least 1 national award.
The employers were asked a number of questions in the course of the interviews designed to elicit their views on the award system and its impact on the funa.
Th· e award process ' The first question concerned the process of award negotiations, and asked whether they had been "generally satisfied or dissatisfied about the opportunities for input and involvement in award negotiations over the past five years". Only 4 employers expressed any dissatisfaction. Even allowing for the fact that almost one-third of the sample f11ans r· eported having been represented at the negotiating table for award negotiations at least once in the past 5 years, a 95 percent satisfaction rating is impressive. The two-thirds of firms that had had no direct involv. ement in award negotiations were unanimous in believing that the process was nonetheless accessible to those interested in being involved. The 4 interviewees expressing dissatisfaction had all had some direct involvement in negotiations.
Award bargaining outcomes . The second line ?f qu~stioning ·on~emed the major outcome of the award process.
?C the 92 e_mployers rnterv?ewe~, 81 mdicated that they had been "usually satisfied" with the wage mcreases negotiated In award negotiations over the past five years". In about equal numbers,.~ese employers cited cost of living, comparable wage movement in other awards, and ab1hty to pay, as their reasons for believing that award wage increases over the years had not been out of line.
Of the employer~ ~xpressin~ general satisfaction with award wages, 24 nonetheless expressed some sp~c1f1c rese~~~ons and these were of 2 types. The first was a one-off concern about the s1ze of the 1n1Ual post-freeze wage increases in the mid-1980s. Perhaps of more consequence for this analysis, about a dozen employers objected 10 one or another premium rate or allowance contained in an award, for the . most part suggesting that the offending item served the purposes of employers or unions in other regions but was not relevant to their particular fn na or lo the southern region.
Of the 11 employers who ~eported that they had been "usually dissatisfied" with award wage increases, . most again cited premium rates or allowances beyond base wages as the sourc· e of their dissatisfaction. Few indicated that the actual movement in base wages had distressed them.
Managing within the . award system
The emerging impression of employers going about their business largely untroubled by the national award system is reinforced by the way in which decisions are made in the sample firms on matters directly and indirectly impacting · employees.
Above award payments
For example, 85 percent of the fu1ns, 78 out of 92, pay abov· e award wage rates to some or all employees cover· ed by awards, some or all of the time. Various reasons were given for paying above the awards, including recruitment and retention, rewarding employees for length of service and loyalty, and the frequently ẽxpressed belief that the firm had a better than av. erage workforce that ' "went the extra mile" for the frrm when necessary. Some other reasons we~e related to the process of award negotiations, and are discussed below. . In more than one-half of the fums, individual perfotanance was at least one of the considerations in setting . abovẽ award pay rates.
These figures are, of course, not inconsistent with the concept of awards as minimum documents. And indeed, the employers generally moved the actual pay lev. els in line with wage increases negotiated in the relevant awards. The situation was, though, somewhat more flexible than this generality suggests.
Only 5 employers reported union involvement, either formal or infonnal, in setting above award pay rates. Another 9 discussed the rates directly with the employees concerned. In short, ẽxcept in these relatively few instances, and except in the handful of fmns with plant agreements, the relationships between actual rates and award rates were determined unilaterally by the employers. Many employers also fr· eely varied these relationships, not only as they related to individual employees but as they related to groups of employees or the workforce as a whole.
For example, about one-third of the employers reported that they routinely adjusted pay rates · when award negotiations stalled, and even more did so occasionally. These adjustments were almost always based either on the increase contained in an award that had settled and that covered some of the ẽmployẽes, or on the figure that was being proposed by either the employers or the union in the unsettled award negotiations. In addition, about one-quarter of the employers reported that they regularly adjust the fn1n•s entire pay structure in line with the pay inc~ease negotiated in the award covering thẽ largest number of their employees, essentially disregarding at least smaller numbers negotiated in the awards covering other staff. A similar number of the funas also adjust such items as premium payments, allowances and time-off entitlements to achieve a measure of cross-award consistency. Rarely is a union reportedly involved in any of this.
Again. , none of this is inconsistent with the notion of awards as minimum documents. However, it is clear that these employers feel fundamentally unrestrained by · the overall level of awaf,d wages or of award wage increases, and exercise basically a free hand in the setting of actual pay rates. The cause and consequence felationship between the efforts of their union and what turns up in their pay envelopes must appear somewhat obscure to many of the . employees represented in the sample.
Other decision areas
The picture is similar in decision areas other than wage setting. In the course o~ ~e interviews, the employers were asked how 3 specific decisions would be handled w1th1n their frrms. The 3 specific items were selected to ẽach represent a broader category of decisions impacting either directly or indirectly on employees.
The fust question related to satety and was intended to gauge how rules of · work and behaviour were made and administered in the fnna. Interviewees wẽre asked: "If an employee had a concern that a machine or proc.edure was u~safe, ho~ would that. be handled?" Only 8 employers indicated that the uruon would be Involved 1n the resoluuon of the problem, while another 8 indicated that the matter would be dealt with by a safety committee.
Consistent with other published data (Mullen, 1990) , only a small percentage of the flffils had a safety committee. In almost all such instances, the committee was seen as a manageq1ent-employee committee rather than a management-union committee. This was consistent with the view expressed by many of the employers that safety was a vital conoem of all employees and was "not a union matter". The bottom line on safety, then, was that in over 80 percent of the filius, a safety problem would be handled by managemen~ with any discussion limited to the employees immẽdiately concerned.
Operational decisions
The second question related to overtime, as representative of the broader category of work and personnel assignments, or operational decisions, and asked: "If overtime had to be worked next week, how would it be decided who works it?" Again a paucity of union influence was evident. Only 6 ẽmployers indicated either that the matter was regulated in whole or part by a union negotiated document or that the union would become involved in the decision as to who worked the time. Another 5 said that 'the overtime would be assigned according to an established plant custom from which they would not feel free to depart. The remainder, almost 90 percent of the sample, felt free to assign the work as they chose, according to qualifications and preference, but unrestrained by awards or unions. About one-half of these indicated that there would nonnally be at least info1 1nal discussions with the affected employee group.
Strategic business decisions
The third question was intended to be illustrative of . more strategic business decisions that nonetheless impact employees. The employers we11e asked: "If consideration was being given to introducing new technology or otherwise significantly changing the work process, would employees or the union(s) be involvẽd before that decision was fmalized? How would that decision be arrived at?" Only 3 employers indicated that the union would be consulted bet:ore such a decision was finalized. Over half of the employers indicated that the proposed c~anges. would be discussed with affected e. mployees, though most stre~sed th~t these _dts~uss1ons would not involve negotiation or employee veto rights. Agatn, the t~presston. IS lar~ely of a. managerial free hand, unencumbered by unions or labour relations constdernuons, an Impression that is entirely consistent with earlier research (McAndrew, 1989) .
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Evaluating the unions
Is this picture of apparent union impotence, indeed near invisibility, matched by employers' views of the unions themselves? Or is, in fact, their ability to manage their affairs seriously impaired by unions in some as yet undocumented way?
The employers interviewed were asked to evaluate whether the principal union did a "good", "fair" or "poor job of representing its members that work for you", and to offer bases for their evaluations.
The bases were open-ended, and were broadly categorized subsequently. As such, the numbers reported below represent the numbers who volunteered the response, and do not necessarily represent the numbers who would agree with the evaluative comments if each basis for evaluation was placed before each interviewee for a reaction. Most of the interviewees provided only 1 basis for their evaluation. Some provided 2 or 3. One employer was not prepared to give an evaluation.
Of the 9lẽmployers who did give an evaluation, 21 said the union did a .. good" job, 38 gave the union a .. fair" evaluation, and 32 felt the union did a "poor" job of representing its members.
The thinking behind the ratings is insuuctive. Those offering a good evaluation unanimously felt that the union representative was reasonable in his or her approach and "could be talked to". Almost an ẽqual number considered that the union representativ· e they dealt with was unreasonable. A full major categories listing of the reasons behind the evaluations is presented in table 1. As is apparent from the table, a fair rating was more often a negative one than a positivẽ one. About one-half of the employers based their evaluation, at least in part, on their perception of the frontline union rẽp~esentative's competence and attitude. Relatedly, the "responsiveness to the membership" categories essentially reflect the employers' views on whether the union representativẽ followed the wishes of the workforce on issues and problems that arose, or tended to, again in the employer's view, dictate positions to the workforce.
The most often . mentioned basis ~or a poor evaluation was the perception that the union did little or nothing for its membership, and seldom or never visited the worksite. Indeed, this was the single most common impression of the unions, being exprẽssed across the fair and poor ẽvaluation categories by about one-third of the employers interviewed. Comments supporting this perception generally related to union visibility and activity at the worksite, rather than to the union's activities in the broader bargaining arena. Of the specific categories in table 1, only the com. ments by some employers that the union was not sufficiently aggressive in representing its members related primarily to national wage bargaining.
Dealings witb the unions A shorthand summary of the evaluations reported above might be that about o~e third of the employers seldom if ever saw a union representative, and of those that did, about half felt that the union representative was reasonable enough and the other half felt that the union representative wasn't so reasonable. This is consistent with the employers' reported dealings with the principal unions in_ the~ fitn~s.
. . Of the 92 employers, 31 had not dealt with the union on any ma~ter m the _preceding 12 months 23 had dealt with the union only once, 18 had dealt with the union 2 or 3 times, and' the remaining 20 had dealt with the union on 4 or more different matters. Questions of award interpretation, dismissals, and rẽdundancy negotiati~ns were _most often mentioned as the most recent matter on which employers had dealt wtth the unton.
Patterns of evaluation
So few employers in the sample exprẽssed dissatisfaction with either the award process or award wages, that no patterns were apparent by industry or other variables. The one point of dissatisfaction expressed by about 20 percent of the sample -extra payments seen as inappropriate to their circumstances -cut across industry categories and showed no relationship to other variables.
Evaluations of the unions were less unanimous than ẽvaluation of the award system, however, and chi-square tests were applied to establish any patterns associated with other variables.
Union evaluation was found to be statistically significantly related to the nature of the business (p<.03), to the number of matters on which the employer had dealt with the union in the prior year (p<.03), and most strongly with whether the employer dealt with a paid union official or a shop floor delegate (p<.005). These variables were, in turn, found to be significantly :related one to another, and to the nature of award coverage.
Specifically, employers who dealt primarily with a shop floor union delegate were far more likely to evaluate the union positively than those who dealt or would deal with the union through a paid union official. ' Those who dealt with a shop . floor delegate were also more likely to have dealt with the union on a relatively large number of matters in the previous year (p<.005). Those who dealt with the union comparatively frequently were, in turn, more likely to evaluate the union positively than those who seldom or never dealt with the union.
Both shop floor delegates (p<.0005) and frequent dealings with the union (p<.00005) werẽ significantly more likely in firms covered in whole or part by plant agreements or regional awards than in fun1s covered exclusively by national awards.
In short summary, those employers most likely to evaluate the union positively were those who dealt with the union relatively frequently, and primarily through a shop floor delegate, and who had empl?yees covered by either plant agreements or regional awards _or both. To ~omplete the c~, cle, each of these characteristics, as well as a positive evaluatl?n of the_ unio.n, was most hkely to be present in firn1s in the agriculture, forestry and fishing classlficauon and least lilcel y in the retail sector.
Other data are consiste_nt with this pat~em .. For example, while the numbers are very small, all of the flints who Involved the union In the detetanination of actual above award pay rates, _or in safety matters, or in assigning overtime opportunities. or in advance of technological or other changes in the production procẽss displayed each of these Labour relations reform characteristics. They dealt with the union regularly through a shop floor delegate, had experience with other than national awards, and they evaluated the union positi 6. Discussion and conclusions
The question for this paper is whether central employer advocates of labour refonn accurately reflect the views and experiences of smaller and medium sized Zealand employers in presenting the case for such refonn.
A recent Employers' Federation publication designed to evoke membez the then anticipated Employment Contracts Bill describes labour relations "reali New Zealand as follows:
Employees display all the expressions of low self esteem, lethargy and hostility ... Going the extra step can be tantamount to betrayal of one's colleagues, an Uncle Tom of the industrial system ... Communication tends to be formal and cliche ridden, mistrusted and directed downwards. Upwards communication is likely to be through the political voice of the job delegate or union official. The subject generally is a wage demand, a personal grievance, or an alleged infringement of long held rights ...
The internal values of the organization are so poorly communicated that lhe union message easily fills lhe vacuum ...
Wage decisions are made irrespective of enterprise profitability, future viability or individual contribution ... Disputes and internal conflicts are commonplace, particularly demarcation disputes (Employers' Federation, l990b, p.4).
In support of this "reality", the "function· " of unions is described as "set(ting) and conditions for employment that inhibit better working relationships". Un.·_. portrayed variously as "outdated", "third party interventionists" and "a major ~·'"' many employer/employee relationships"'. . By almost comic contrast, in the organization of the future, "staff associations, where they exist, are loyal and strong".
There is no evidence to hand as to whether or not this dismal depiction inlell represents widespread lalx>ur relations reality in larger or more northerly workplaces. AI a picture of reality in smaller and medium sized southern · workplaces, however, it is nonsense.
For most of the fiitns in the sample, labour relations has a very low profile· The union and the award system impact the rate of increase in the overall pay levelllld are responsible for some extra payments that are irritating to some employers, and daat perhaps suggests the need for decentralization of the bargaining structure. Beyond dlat, the union becomes involved on the odd occasion when somebody is confronted wi~ die loss of a job for one reason or another.
Õtherwise, most of these employers function basically unencumbered by unioas or the labour relations system. This majority are untroubled by the national award They have a predominantly if mildly negative view of unions, though this is not a view based on relentless union harassment. Rather, it is a view constructed of 2 things: die perception on the part of many employers that the union does not do anything for Ill membership, and the perception on the part of some others that the union has taken a than reasonable position on the very mre occasions ' that they have come into contact with
There is absolutely no basis in the data for suggesting that in the large majority of firms in the sample, the union represents a pervasive or, in any way, a restraining fQICe. Quite to the contrary. For this majority of employers, the rather remote labour relations system allows them a virtually free hand in setting actual · wage rates according to their
McAndrew and Hursthouse own criteria, and in making both day to day operational and more strategic business decisions. . . Additionally, in the majority of fiJ ans, not only is there no evidence that un1ons block direct communications, either up or down, between managers and the workforce, but indeed there is no evidence that unions insinuate themselves in any way. ' Certainly there is far more discussion with employees than negotiation with unions apparent in each of the decision areas tested. And, while few examples of formal employee participation mechanisms were uncovered in the research, opportunities for inCotanal consultation between employers and employees abound.
There is, as noted, a minority of employers in the sample who have a closer involvement with unions and labour relations generally, dealing relatively regularly with unions, often through shop floor delegates and localized documents. How, ever, few of these fiints where unions do have a more active presence perceived unions as a menace . . Instead, these firms tended to evaluate unions in quite positive tel 1ns. In labour relations, familiarity apparently does not breed contempt any more than absence makes the heart grow fonder. Does all of this mean that further labour relations reform is unwarranted? Not necessarily. If nothing else, the evidence that active plant-levellabour relations is viewed positively by those employers with experience of it feinforces the notion that moves to further decentralize the labour ~elations system are to be applauded. And there is other evidence to indicate that many employers may, in fact, benefit from labour relations restructuring (McAndrew and Hursthouse, 1990) .
The conclusions from the data pfesented have to be drawn more sharply. The data suggests, at the very least, that the basic rationale put forth by employer organizations as a basis for reforna in a deregulatory direction, rather than in the direction of managed decentralization, is not consistent with the views and ẽxperiences of smaller southern employers. For the most part, they simply do not see, or apparently have, 'the labour relations problems portrayed so passionately by the Employers' Federation. Certainly, the Employers' Federation's new focus on individual freedom of contract meets no pressing need apparent in the data.
Whether the south is at odds with the rest of the nation, or whether the Employers' Federation is engaged in a curious exercise in marginalizing itself from mainstream employer opinion is a question that must await more national testing. It must be said that there is much merit in the positive elements of the Employers' Federation's position, advocating as it does attention to developing more comprehensive working relationships betw~n .emp~oye~s and employẽes, and more productivẽ ways of working. However, there IS l~ttle m this ~La ~o suggest that unions in New Zealand are a barrier to lhis type of essentially managenalllllprovemenL
